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ESSAYS




This is not an Essay calling for the protection of “Peanuts,” the
royal blue elephant.1  Nor is this Essay concerned with the confusion
surrounding “Iggy,” the Iguana or “Rainbow,” the Chameleon.2  This
Essay does not even reflect on the ramifications of Ty, Inc.’s decision
to retire Beanie Babies on December 31, 1999,3 followed by its later
decision to continue production.4  Rather, the focus of this Essay is on
whether Congress needs to pass a specific statute to criminalize
Beanie Baby fraud.
                                                                
* “Beanie Babies” are produced by Ty, Inc.
** Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.  Visiting Scholar, Yale
Law School, Fall 1998.  B.S., 1973, Syracuse University; J.D., 1976, Indiana University
School of Law at Indianapolis; M.B.A., 1987, University of Chicago; LL.M., 1989, Temple
University School of Law.  The author thanks Professor Neil Kinkopf for his research
suggestions and Professor Peter Henning for his comments on a draft of this Essay.
1. Ty, Inc., produced two different “Peanut” Beanie Babies.  One is a light blue
elephant that was retired on May 1, 1998, and the other is a royal blue elephant that
was retired on October 2, 1995.
2. “Iggy” and “Rainbow’s” tags were inadvertently reversed in January, 1998.  See
LES & SUE FOX, THE BEANIE BABY HANDBOOK 66 (1998).
3. See Paula Lyon & Natalie Evans, Ty to Retire Beanie Babies at Year End, CRAIN’S
CHI. BUS., Sept. 6, 1999, at 106 (reporting that Ty, Inc., announced the retirement of
all Beanie Babies as of Dec. 31, 1999); see also Claudia H. Deutsch, Ty Puts Beanie
Babies’ Fate Into the Hands of Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1999, at B11 (discussing
Ty, Inc.’s announcement to “let the public vote on whether it should keep producing
new Beanie Babies in the new millennium”).
4. See Renee Strovsky, Beanie Babies Show Up Again, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, May 1,
2000, at D1 (discussing Ty’s decision to continue producing Beanie Babies following
an online vote of the public supporting continued production of Beanie Babies).
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In the past, I have argued in favor of specific fraud statutes.5  The
widespread use of generic fraud statutes, such as mail fraud6 and
conspiracy to defraud,7 have allowed prosecutorial discretion to
exceed what historically would have been considered part of the
executive function.8  Prosecutors have attempted to legislate against
new forms of criminality by prosecuting illegal activity under generic
fraud statutes.9  I considered the passage of the computer fraud
statute,10 the health care fraud statute,11 and the bank fraud statute12
to be legislative advancements because these statutes offered specific
legislative definitions of what would constitute criminal conduct.13
But in calling for specific statutes, it is equally important to realize
that enacting a multitude of specific statutes to address every new
instance of fraud is absurd.  Although the constant enactment of new
federal statutes may foster political careers by demonstrating a tough
stand on crime,14 adding new volumes to the criminal code for
political purposes serves little benefit in the development of criminal
law.15  The excessive number of federal statutes is well documented
and is detrimental to the development of an efficient legal process.16
Discerning the appropriate line in legislative drafting between the
                                                                
5. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 735 (1999)
(advocating that “specific fraud statutes . . . offer tighter restraints which conform
more closely with the initial legislative purpose of the statute.”).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Peter J. Henning, Maybe
It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud:  The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36
B.C. L. REV. 435, 438 (1995) (describing how the crime of mail fraud has been
applied expansively).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 408 (1959) (arguing that the concepts of “‘conspiracy’
and ‘defraud’ have assumed such broad and imprecise proportions”).
8. See Podgor, supra note 5, at 732-33 (noting that prosecutors have used fraud
statutes to generate new fraud theories).
9. Prosecutors have used the mail fraud statute to prosecute “‘divorce mill’
fraud, insurance fraud, securities fraud, and franchise fraud.” Id. at 753-54.
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
11. See id. § 1347.
12. See id. § 1344.
13. For example, in the computer fraud statute, Congress used seven specific
applications of fraud.  See id. § 1030(a)(1)-(7).
14. “In the face of serious and offensive incidents, it is becoming more and more
frequent for citizens and legislators to simply urge that Congress should make the
conduct a federal crime.”  TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 12 (1999),
available at <http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedcrimlaw.pdf> [hereinafter TASK
FORCE].
15. “[S]everal recently enacted federal statutes, championed by many because
they have a claimed impact on crime, have hardly been used at all.”  Id. at 20; see also
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime:  Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 42-44 (1996) (noting that “[b]y the mid-1990s, there
were more than 3,000 federal crimes”).
16. See TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 43 (“Inappropriate federalization scatters,
rather than focuses, the resources needed to combat crime.”).
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overly generic fraud statute, such as mail fraud, and the addition of
an overly specific statute, such as Beanie Baby fraud, necessitates an
examination of several factors.  Clearly, issues of federalism warrant
consideration to determine whether the conduct belongs in the
realm of the state and local prosecutor or more aptly in the federal
system.17  Likewise, the scope of the federal statute needs to be clear
in order to avoid ambiguity, overbreadth, and application of the Rule
of Lenity.18  This Essay, however, looks to a third factor for
considering the propriety of the legislation:  whether the statute is
designed to advance the historic roles provided to each of the three
branches of government.  When the legislation accords a fair
balancing to the executive, legislature, and judicial bodies, the
appropriate line between the generic and specific statute is
achieved.19
I. EFFICIENCY AND ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
WARRANT SPECIFIC FRAUD STATUTES
Overly generic statutes can alter the balance of power, placing
inordinate weight in the executive branch of government. The mail
fraud statute, referred to by Jed Rakoff as a prosecutor’s
                                                                
17. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Introduction:  Macro and Micro Evaluation of the
Federalization of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 757 (1996) (“[W]hether one
characterizes the phenomenon of the multiplication of federal criminal statutes as a
matter of federalism or federalization, the question is basically the same—which
governmental entity, the states or the Congress, is better situated to enforce what
types of crime?”); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:  The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1136 (1995) (concluding that “long standing
issues of federalism” cannot be reconciled with “the trend to expand the body of
federal criminal law and enlarge police power”).
18. See Podgor, supra note 5, at 760-61 (noting that the judiciary has not been
able to “curtail prosecutorial decision-making by restricting the use of a generic
statute when a more specific statute also applies”).
19. This Essay goes beyond questions of statutory interpretation.  Although the
constitutional framework for deciding the need for this legislation is in keeping with
a “new textualism” analysis, its application is pre-interpretative.  See Jerry L. Marshaw,
Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 827, 845 (1991) (noting that it is impossible to know the intent of a legislature
in drafting a statute).  This Essay also does not focus on the propriety of legislative
delegation.  See generally Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 758-60 (1999) (examining
the magnitude of the legislative delegation of power and discretion to federal
prosecutors in the criminal arena).  Although discussion in this regard is necessary,
this Essay does not resolve the right or power of the legislature to delegate its
authority.  Some courts note, however, that there are significant benefits in having a
coherent body of federal criminal law.  See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
757 (1996) (“Deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule is not the sole reason for
dispersing the federal power among three branches, however.  By allocating specific
powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a
National Government that is both effective and accountable.”).
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“Stradivarius” or “Colt 45,”20 historically serves as a “stop-gap device”
used until the legislature has the opportunity to pass “particularized
legislation.”21  Because “particularized legislation” is rare, prosecutors
often assume the role of determining the criminality that will be
encompassed within the generic statute.  In some instances, their
determinations have proved accurate.22  In other cases, however, the
judiciary finds the conduct beyond the parameters of the statute.23
Although criminality, an evil within itself, should not be left
unpunished, one presupposes that the prosecutor is correct in
labeling the conduct as criminal.  As noted by Judge Edmondson in
reversing a mail fraud conviction in United States v. Brown,24 “[a]
limitless reading of the mail fraud statute could result in a kind of
federal criminal common law, that is, a situation where a person
could be convicted of a crime against the United States despite the
conduct not violating an express statutory provision.”25
In some instances, the judicial function of checking prosecutorial
excess can lead to legislative action.  For example, in McNally v. United
States,26 the Court rejected an intangible rights theory as a scheme to
defraud for purposes of mail fraud.27  This decision was followed by
congressional legislation supporting prosecutors’ use of mail fraud
statutes in cases when the charge was premised upon a deprivation of
the intangible right to honest services.28  As a result of the new
definition of what could be included as fraud,29 prosecutors could
                                                                
20. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771
(1980).
21. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that “[w]hen a ‘new’ fraud develops . . . the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap
device to deal on a temporary basis . . . .”).
22. See Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud:  Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 557, 560 (1998) [hereinafter Podgor, Mail Fraud] (noting that “a wide array of
conduct has been prosecuted as mail fraud”).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996)
(reversing mail fraud conviction determining that the defendants were wrongly
convicted of charging “high prices” and not of deceiving buyers); United States v.
D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing mail fraud conviction by refusing to
“infer fraudulent intention on the part of an attorney who accepts a retainer
arrangement and is subsequently not called upon to perform services that the
government or trier of fact deems worth the fee paid”).  See generally Podgor, Mail
Fraud, supra note 22, at 561-71 (discussing numerous cases in which mail fraud
convictions have been reversed by appellate courts).
24. 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).
25. Id. at 1556-57.
26. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
27. See id. at 356 (“The mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but
does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.”).
28. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat.
4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) (providing for a
mail fraud provision within legislation addressing drug abuse).
29. Section 1346 states, “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or
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resume some of their charging practices with legislative
authorization.
In contrast to generic statutes that reserve for the executive the
prerogative to take action against fraudulent conduct, but do so
without the certainty of knowing whether the judiciary will curtail this
discretion, more specific statutes expressly limit the prosecutorial
charging function.  By limiting the instrumentality of the fraud,
prosecutors may only use the specific fraud statute when the conduct
falls within the strict confines of the statute.  For example, one
cannot be charged with bank fraud if the fraud has not been
committed on a federally insured bank.30  Likewise, absent a
bankruptcy matter, there can be no prosecution for bankruptcy
fraud.31  The benefit of specific statutes over generic statutes is two-
fold:  First, there is an increased efficiency when prosecutors know
the types of conduct that fall within the parameters of the statute.32
Second, the legislature, not the executive, assumes the lawmaking
role.33  Clearly, the judicial system is enhanced when defendants are
only subjected to the criminal process in cases that can offer
punishment.
II. THE PERVASIVENESS OF BEANIE BABY FRAUD
If one assumes that specific statutes present a superior role over
generic statutes, logically it should follow that a Beanie Baby fraud
statute would be worthwhile. Prosecutors would not need to use mail
fraud, wire fraud, computer fraud, or theft as the vehicles for
charging Beanie Baby fraud.34  Further, a specific statute might
                                                                
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services.”  Id.
30. In United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 906 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second
Circuit, in reversing a bank fraud conviction, cited to the House Judiciary
Committee’s consideration of the bank fraud statute where it was stated that “[t]he
Committee, however, is concerned by the history of expansive interpretations of that
language [i.e., ‘scheme to defraud’ in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343] by the courts.
The current scope of the wire and mail fraud offenses is clearly greater than that
intended by Congress.”  Id.
31. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (listing violative activities
and defining bankruptcy fraud, respectively).
32. See Podgor, supra note 5, at 735 (noting that specific fraud statutes allow for
“appropriate government prosecutions” but tend to control the ambiguity and
prosecutions).
33. But see Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 5 (1997) (finding a “legislative supremacy position [that] conceives
of federal crimes as purely legislative in origin” as “a rank fiction”).
34. One also finds prosecutors using other statutes to combat Beanie Baby fraud.
See, e.g., Beanie Babies Are Hot in More Ways Than One, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 2,
1998, at 4 (detailing charges brought against individuals for receiving stolen property
and committing fraud and theft in connection with Beanie Babies).
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provide the impetus for needed resources to combat this criminality,
which often requires extensive time and technology to properly
investigate.35  In addition, when the initial nefarious conduct includes
the improper purchase of Beanie Babies, prosecutors might be able
to add a Beanie Baby fraud charge to existing charges, thus providing
multiple counts in the indictment.36  One can only imagine if the
funds obtained from Beanie Baby fraud activity might eventually be a
basis for a money laundering charge.37
Beanie Baby fraud is a reality.38  The crime occurs in the state,39
federal,40 and international arenas.41  The Internet has further blurred
the jurisdictional line by facilitating illegal conduct that extends
beyond state borders.42  A wide range of individuals indulge in Beanie
                                                                
35. In discussing fraud cases via the Internet, including Beanie Baby fraud, one
journalist reported that “[m]any local police departments don’t have the time or
resources to probe Internet fraud cases, which often involve time-consuming work
that crosses state lines.”  Regina Hong, The Safety Zone Spotlight:  Gray Areas Hinder Web
Fraud Probes Limits on Resources, Time, Jurisdiction Often Leave Investigations in Limbo,
L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at B2.
36. See Gretchen Schuldt, Ex-Chief of Bank Gets 63 Months; Man Guilty of Embezzling
Wanted to Make Spouse Happy, Attorney Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1
(describing a man convicted of embezzlement who used stolen money to purchase
$10,914 worth of Beanie Babies).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (detailing the elements of
money laundering).
38. See, e.g., Bogus Beanies Are Sprouting Up All Over the Place in South King County,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 1998, at B2 (detailing the story of a woman defrauded by a
man selling fake Beanie Babies); Henry Farber, Bogus Beanies Quell Collector’s Urge to
Buy, ATL. J. CONST., May 27, 1999, at JG3 (telling the story of a woman whose money
was returned after she was sold fake Beanie Babies); Diane White, Beanie Babies’
Popularity Spawns a Small Crime Wave, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1998 (“A wave of
Beanie Baby-related crime is sweeping the nation.”).
39. See, e.g., Tony Gordon, Mundelein Man Pleads Innocent in Beanie Scam, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Jan. 21, 1999, at 5 (noting that the defendant was accused of selling
fake Beanie Babies over the Internet); Police Blotter, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr.
20, 1999, at F2 (reporting larceny of Beanie Babies in Albany, New York); Amanda
Vogt, Man Is Accused of Conducting Beanie Baby Scam on Internet, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1998, at 3 (accounting the story of a defendant charged with five counts of felony
computer fraud and five counts of felony theft in connection with the sale of fake
Beanie Babies).
40. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Couple Plead Guilty to Duping Shoppers in Beanie Baby Scam,
ATL. J. CONST., June 26, 1999, at F1 (describing a couple who entered guilty pleas to
federal mail fraud charges in connection with Beanie Baby fraud); 2 Indicted in Beanie
Baby Scheme, ATL. J. CONST., Feb. 10, 1999, at B6 [hereinafter 2 Indicted] (describing
the indictments in this same case).
41. See, e.g., Britons Seize Fake Beanie Babies, AP, Nov. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL
23031519 (accounting the seizure of counterfeit Beanie Babies toys worth “about a
half-million dollars” in England); Margaret Zack, St. Louis Park Couple Accused of
Smuggling Fake Beanie Babies, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 25, 1999, at 8B
(reviewing federal charges against a couple for allegedly smuggling fake Beanie
Babies into the United States from China and selling them over the Internet).
42. See NJ Alleges Beanie Baby Auction Fraud, AP, Feb. 14, 2000, available in 2000 WL
14320296 (discussing how Beanie Baby vendors were accused of fraud in their use of
online auctions); The Police Log, Irvine Citizen, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Cal.), Aug. 26, 1999,
at O6 (stating that online auction sites have defrauded buyers from New York to
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Baby fraud.  This fraud is perpetrated by both men and women and it
is not conduct exclusive to juveniles.  One finds individuals of all ages
charged with crimes related to Beanie Baby fraud.43
Using criminal statutes to curtail Beanie Baby fraud activity raises
many of the same issues encountered in other criminal law contexts.
For example, courts have forced the issue of whether crimes involving
Beanie Babies are committed as a result of an addiction,44 and
whether persons committing Beanie Baby fraud should receive a
reduced prison sentence because of an addiction.45  Some
commentators have called for the abolition of Beanie Babies claiming
that this could curtail the criminal activity.46  Administrative efforts
such as the recent passage of a new postal regulation that requires
those providing private mailboxes to “obtain a photo identification
and verify an applicant’s home address before renting a mailbox,”
may assist in curbing this criminal activity.47 
Beanie Baby fraud can be part of a sophisticated scheme48 or just
                                                                
Hawaii).
43. See, e.g., Beanie Babies Purchase Brings Police Boy Lifted Credit Card Code to Obtain
Toys on Internet, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 8, 1998, at 8 (detailing the story of a 12-
year-old charged with Beanie Baby fraud); Beanie Baby Fraud Alleged, PALM BEACH
POST (Fla.), Oct. 31, 1998, at 3D (stating that an 18- and a 19-year-old were charged
with one count of scheming to defraud, 6 counts of grand theft and 11 counts of
petty theft); Couple Sentenced in Beanie Babies Scam, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Oct. 7, 1998, at 7B (noting that a 58- and 55-year-old couple were sentenced in a
Beanie Baby scam); Woman Charged in Beanie Scam, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne, Fla.),
Feb. 1, 1998, at 8B (stating that a 35-year-old woman was charged with Beanie Baby
fraud).
44. See Beanie Babies Addiction Lands a Collector in Jail, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov.
20, 1998, at A30 (reporting that defendant was prohibited from possessing Beanie
Babies because “the toys . . . are like a drug and ought to be treated as such”); Toy
Addict Jailed on Theft Charges, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1998, at 11 [hereinafter Theft
Charges] (“A woman who used stolen credit card numbers to feed her habit was given
6 months in jail and 5 years of probation on condition she not touch her drug of
choice:  Beanie Babies.”).
45. See Stephen Hudak, Sentence Cut In Beanies Fraud, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 18, 1999,
at 1B (describing how a judge halved the sentence of a woman claiming to be
addicted to Beanie Babies).
46. See Diane White, Is it Time for a Beanie Baby Ban?, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22,
1998, at D7 (describing “extreme Beanie Baby-related crimes,” including smuggling,
forgery, robbery and “incidences of thievery, duplicity, and fraud,” and speculating
that “for every Beanie Baby crime that makes the news, you can be sure that there are
dozens, maybe even hundreds, more that we never hear about”); Diane White, Time
to Halt Crime Wave by Banning Beanie Babies, STAR TRIB.  (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug.
10, 1998, at 4E (“If Beanie Babies are outlawed only outlaws will have Beanie
Babies.”).
47. See Kelly St. John, Postal Service Change Angers Modesto, Calif.-Area Merchants,
MODESTO BEE (Cal.), June 11, 1999 (noting that the changes are designed to prevent
credit card fraud and other crime, but compliance often is costly to legitimate
businesses).
48. See Hong, supra note 35, at B2 (noting numerous Beanie Baby scams
operating on the Internet).
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plain old-fashioned theft.49  One finds an array of perverse conduct as
the basis for Beanie Baby fraud charges.  For example, fraud charges
were filed where an individual obtained the stuffed toys for free
premised on a false representation that the toys were going to a sick
child.50  Another incident involved allegations that a couple placed
“classified ads in newspapers, offering to sell rare and unusual Beanie
Babies to help them run their homeless shelter.”51
The number of victims of Beanie Baby fraud is extensive.52  Law
enforcement has investigated counterfeit Beanie Babies.  For
example, customs agents “detained a quarter-million counterfeit
Beanie Babies at the Port of Oakland, Calif[ornia].”53  The Internet
has been a vehicle for Beanie Baby scams with “charges of computer
fraud and conducting a false auction” used where an individual was
accused of using “on-line auctions to defraud Beanie Baby fanatics
out of thousands of dollars by pretending to sell stuffed animals that
were never delivered.”54  Internet auction fraud also has been a
statutory basis used in the criminal prosecution of a “‘fictitious’ series
of Beanie Babies.”55  It is no surprise that Internet fraud is a
Department of Justice priority, perhaps, in part, because of conduct
such as Beanie Baby fraud.56  In addition to computer fraud and
Internet auction fraud, prosecutors also have used the federal mail
                                                                
49. See City Desk News, PEORIA J. STAR (Ill.), July 24, 1998, at B2 (describing the
theft of 184 Beanie Babies).
50. See Patti Weaver, Plea Entered in Beanie Baby Fraud Case, TULSA WORLD, July 13,
1999, at 7 (describing how an avid Beanie Baby collector pleaded guilty to obtaining
money by fraud after she convinced the owner of a gift shop, who had recently lost a
daughter to cancer, to donate several Beanie Babies that the collector claimed would
be given to a sick nine-year-old girl).
51. Stephen Hudak, Medina Officer Once Again Hot on the Toy Trail of Beanie Fraud,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 27, 1999, at 1B.
52. See Tanya Eiserer, Omahan Sought in Beanie Scam; An Internet Auction Site Was
Used to Bilk Would-Be Toy Buyers of at Least $10,000, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 9,
1999, at 1 (describing how 28 people from 20 states claimed they sent money for
purchase of Germania bear); Clark Mason, More than 200 Victims in Net Fraud Case,
Police Say Additional Charges Due in Beanie Baby Auction Scam, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa
Rosa, Cal.), Oct. 1, 1999, at B1 (“Authorities plan to slap more charges on a man
accused of running an Internet Beanie Baby scam that has turned up more than 200
victims around the country and abroad, a number that is expected to grow.”);
Officials Close in on Beanie Baby Scam, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), May 3, 1998, at B8
(“About 75 people who ordered Beanie Babies from an Internet site complained
they did not receive their merchandise.”).
53. Fake Beanie Babies Facing Bulldozer, ATL. J. CONST., Dec. 23, 1998, at A10.
54. Michael Cooper, Beanie Baby Scams and Identity Thefts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1999, at 19.
55. Kenny MacIver, Beanie Baby Fraud Exposed, LONDON TIMES, Aug. 4, 1999, at 15.
56. See Michael J. Sniffen, Clinton Administration Targets Internet Fraud; Program Will
Crack Down on Growing Threat, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6, 1999, at 1F (noting
that this is the first time that the Department of Justice has made Internet fraud a
priority).
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and wire fraud statutes to prosecute Beanie Baby fraud.57
Prosecutors have not attempted, however, to proceed criminally
with all possible Beanie Baby abuses.  For instance, one does not find
criminal charges being used when there are allegations that a teacher
“traded bonus points for Beanie Babies.”58  Likewise, individuals
inadvertently bringing a few extra Beanie Babies into the United
States in violation of trade restrictions have not been prosecuted for
these acts.59  The sale of counterfeit Beanie Babies can also be the
subject of a civil action.  Although scholars have criticized the
“blurring” between civil fraud and criminal fraud,60 this discussion, as
of yet, has not entered into the context of Beanie Babies.61
III. FEDERALIZATION CONCERNS TEMPER THE NEED FOR A BEANIE BABY
FRAUD STATUTE
Having a distinct federal criminal statute for every conceivable
product that might be the instrumentality of a fraud would present
criminal codes that far exceed library budgets.  Two interrelated
considerations are at play here.  The first consideration is whether a
federal statute needs to be enacted.  Is the conduct in fact a federal
concern?  Assuming the federal government should be monitoring
                                                                
57. See Bill Rankin, supra note 40, at F1 (reporting that a couple accumulated
more than $53,000 in a Beanie Baby scam before they pleading guilty to mail fraud);
2 Indicted, supra note 40, at B6 (reporting a federal grand jury indictment of a couple
who received bids over the Internet for Beanie Babies they did not possess);
Margaret Zack, Couple Sentenced for Selling Counterfeit Beanie Babies, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 6, 1999, at 3B [hereinafter Zack, Counterfeit Beanie
Babies] (describing defendants who were sentenced on charges of conspiracy to
commit mail fraud after smuggling counterfeit Beanie Babies from China and selling
them over the Internet).
58. Jennifer Brett, Cobb School Board Set to Rule in Beanie Case, ATL. J. CONST., July
21, 1999, at C4.
59. See Official Chagrined by Beanie Babies, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at 7 (discussing
inadvertent violation of a trade restriction by reentering the United States with more
than the permitted number of Beanie Babies).
60. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1890 (1992) (arguing
that criminal law should be confined to “clearly egregious behavior”); Kenneth
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101
YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992) (“[T]he criminal law is meant to punish, while the civil
law is meant to compensate.  The criminal and civil law, each with different purposes
and procedural rules, constitute paradigms by which legislatures and courts analyze
their actions and by which textbooks and scholarly literature structure arguments.”)
(citations omitted).
61. The criticism recently vocalized by Professor Coffee as to whether federal
mail fraud charges are appropriate in the case of a private fraud, as opposed to being
limited to public frauds, may be applicable to Beanie Baby fraud. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Modern Mail Fraud:  The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 427, 430 (1998) [hereinafter Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud] (“Courts have proven
much less willing to tolerate the criminalization of minor transgressions in the
private context than they have in the public context.”).
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the criminality, the second question for consideration is whether
existing legislation properly covers the criminal conduct.  In part, this
second question implicates legislative drafting.  Both of these
questions also encompass constitutional legitimacy concerns.62
In the federal arena, over-federalization is the discussion of today.63
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized over-federalization at a recent
American Law Institute meeting.64  Although there is no consensus on
whether over-federalization exists65 and whether it is problematic,66
the American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Federalization of
Criminal Law noted “that of all federal crimes enacted since 1865,
over forty percent have been created since 1970.”67  The ABA Task
Force discusses the harms accruing from the increased federalization
of crimes.  The preface to the Task Force’s Report states “that the
congressional appetite for new crimes regardless of their merit is not
only misguided and ineffectual, but has serious adverse
consequences, some of which have already occurred and some of
which can be confidently predicted.”68  Perhaps the most fascinating
observation included in this report is that “several recently enacted
federal statutes, championed by many because they would have a
                                                                
62. See Marshaw, supra note 19, at 845 (discussing the role of new textualism in
the interpretive process).
63. See TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 43 (arguing that the federalization trend is
“capable of altering and undermining the careful decentralization of criminal law”);
Ashdown, supra note 17, at 757 (“The states are not suffering from or complaining
about the rampant enactment of federal criminal statutes which duplicate the
coverage of their own criminal codes. The enforcement of these dual jurisdictional
offenses by the federal government takes some of the burden off of state and local
law enforcement.”); Brickey, supra note 17, at 1172 (“Thus, instead of
complementing state criminal law, federal law began competing with it.  Federal
duplication of state criminal law unduly burdens the federal justice system, which is
ill-equipped to supplant local law enforcement. The system is strained to
capacity . . . .”).
64. See William H. Rehnquist, Address to the 75th Annual American Law Institute
Meeting (May 11, 1998) (arguing that over-federalization creates an unnecessary
burden on the federal government) (copy on file with author).
65. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1031 (1995) (emphasizing that despite the addition of many federal crimes in recent
years, federal courts still handle only a small percentage of criminal prosecutions).
66. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 247, 324 (1997) (“Federalism-based considerations suggest that the
national government should increase its share of enforcement efforts in a way that
advances its historic and inspiring role of promoting equality of opportunity along
income and racial lines.”).  But see Brickey, supra note 17, at 1172 (criticizing federal
criminal law as competing with state law and straining the federal judicial system,
especially noting the burdensome effects of the extensive federalization of drug
laws).
67. TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 2.
68. Id. at 3; see also H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize is a Road to Ruin, 8
CRIM. J. 8, 9 (1993) (arguing that federalization of criminal statutes is not the answer
to fighting crime).
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claimed importance on crime, have hardly been used at all.”69
Arguably, the ABA Task Force’s criticism of federal statutes that are
never used as the basis of enforcement is misdirected in this context,
because already there have been several prosecutions related to
Beanie Baby fraud.
One needs to consider federalism issues when determining
whether to enact a federal statute.  Is the conduct in fact strictly a
local concern?  Is the federal government better equipped to handle
the investigation or prosecution?70  Does the fraud have implications
in the international arena?71  These and other questions can be
explored in determining the appropriate line between federal and
state authority.
In addition, the question of whether the conduct should be subject
to criminal penalty, or more appropriately addressed with civil
remedies, must be considered.  Furthermore, one must consider
other influential factors such as the harm involved, the necessity for
the criminal punishment, and whether the fraud is private or public.72
The prosecution of Beanie Baby fraud has occurred at the federal
and state levels.  Some state cases employ classic theft offenses, while
mail fraud and other federal offenses may be used when the activity
produces effects beyond a locality.73  One can, of course, question the
need for federal government intervention in some of the Beanie Baby
fraud prosecutions.  The use of mediums such as the Internet,
                                                                
69. TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 20.  The Report states:
Two of the most publicized recent violent federalizations, drive-by shooting
and interstate domestic violence, were not cited in a single prosecution in
fiscal year 1997.  Both federal statutes have been in effect since 1994. . . .
[M]any other recently enacted federal criminal statutes have been used
rarely or not at all.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political
Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 340 (1983) (“Federal prosecution of local offenses
such as political corruption is justified in cases where local enforcement officials are
incapable of successfully prosecuting serious offenses.”).
71. See Ellen S. Podgor, Essay, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar
Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325, 327 (1997) (analyzing the international
jurisdictional questions “that have arisen as a result of white collar criminal activity”).
72. See Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 61, at 459 (arguing in favor of a
sharp distinction between private and public fraud statutes).  If Congress decides it is
appropriate to criminalize private frauds, then a statute with appropriate limitations
could accomplish this goal.  The statute could offer monetary limitations.  It could
offer limiting language as to what constitutes a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”
Podgor, supra note 5, at 762.  The federal concern might not be as pervasive as the
mailing element of mail fraud that includes innocent mailings, routine mailings, or
no mailing where the delivery is via an interstate carrier. See id. at 760-67.
73. See Zack, Counterfeit Beanie Babies, supra note 57, at 3B (noting that the
defendants, who smuggled Beanie Babies from China, pled guilty to a charge of
conspiracy to commit mail fraud in federal court); Theft Charges, supra note 44, at 11
(describing four women who pled guilty to four counts of burglary).
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however, provide strong arguments for increased federal
enforcement.
IV. CORRELATING THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATION WITH A
DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE OF GOVERNMENT
POWER
If, in fact, there is a basis for federal enforcement, then a
methodology needs to be considered for effectuating this process.  A
key factor for discussion here is whether there is a need to adopt a
specific Beanie Baby fraud statute, or prosecute the activity under
existing legislation.  Where is the appropriate line in the legislative
drafting process between the overly generic statute and the specific
statute?  Should the appropriate statute be “toy fraud” to encompass
not only fraudulent Beanie Babies, but also fraud with respect to
Pokemons?74  Or perhaps product fraud would offer a more efficient
range for these criminal prosecutions?
It is always important to provide clear statutes.  Generic statutes can
be vague and overbroad and therefore, fail to advise citizens of what
conduct constitutes a crime.  Generic statutes also provide forums for
prosecutors to exceed their charging authority.  When the Rule of
Lenity needs to be employed, Congress is on notice that it needs to
modify the statute if the court’s statutory interpretation is contrary to
Congress’s intent.75
Federalism concerns and clarity of existing legislation, however,
only present portions of the picture that should be used in deciding
the need for a criminal statute and the posture that should be taken
in drafting the statute.  Consideration also needs to be given to
whether the statute provides a proper balance of power among the
three branches of government.
The appropriate line between the generic statute and the specific
statute can be found when the statute results in each of the three
branches of government serving the normative roles appropriate to
their respective branch.  Questions that warrant consideration here
are:  Will the statute require prosecutors to serve as lawmakers?  Will
                                                                
74. See, e.g., Margaret O’Brien & David Heinzmann, A Monstrous Pokemon Seizure,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1999, at 1 (“But like the Beanie Babies, Cabbage Patch dolls,
Power Rangers and Furbies that were the hottest, greatest, most stupendous things in
the history of the world in their bygone eras, adult-style greed already has begun to
pervert the innocence of the latest childhood fad.”).
75. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (“Ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345 (1994)
(arguing that the “rule of lenity” is essential to “securing a variety of values of near-
constitutional stature”).
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the statute require the judiciary to serve in a lawmaking role?  Will
there in fact be “legislative supremacy?”76
The framework composing our governmental structure is premised
upon three branches that, although separate, are not “wholly
unconnected with each other.”77  More than “parchment
demarcations” are necessary.78  Essential to this framework is the
notion that the “several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.”79
The balance of power among the three government branches is
achieved when the judicial branch reverses a conviction finding that
the prosecution has exceeded the statute.  In such circumstances the
judicial branch does not permit the executive to encroach the
legislative function.  Balancing can also be seen when the executive
uses its prosecutorial prerogative and decides not to use a statute
passed by the legislature.  As previously noted, this is a common
occurrence with newly enacted statutes.80  The balancing process can
be seen when the tension between the three branches causes a
mediated response.81
What is interesting to note, however, is that in considering all of
these scenarios, the balancing process typically is responsive to action
by one branch of the government.  It occurs only after one branch
has engaged in conduct.82  Further, it is only activated when a
defendant believes that one branch has exceeded its authority.
Whether the executive has exceeded its powers becomes an issue only
after the indictment and only after a defendant has selected this issue
as one to be reviewed.
A balancing approach from a proactive perspective offers a more
efficient process.  Defendants are not subject to inappropriate
prosecutorial discretion caused by an improper use of a generic
                                                                
76. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Article I’s precise rules
of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make
Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.”).
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
78. See id.
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
80. See TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 20 (“Two of the most publicized recent
violent federalizations, drive-by shooting and interstate domestic violence, were not
cited in a single prosecution in fiscal year 1997.”).
81. The separation of powers that facilitates this balancing stresses a federalist
approach.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers:  A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 404 (1996) (“[S]eparation of powers
established balanced government, thereby discouraging rash or arbitrary action.”).
82. See supra note 23 (demonstrating the balancing process when the judiciary
reverses convictions and finds that the prosecution exceeded the statute).
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statute.83  Further, clogging within the courts is relieved when non-
criminal matters are filtered out of the system prior to indictment.84
Proactive balancing is achieved when a statute’s passage in Congress
includes a thorough consideration of whether the statute is in accord
with the historic role of each governmental branch.
Additionally, in deciding the need for legislation, it would be
helpful if the historic roles of the branches were used as a source for
determining the necessity for the legislation.  Finding the line
between the generic statute and the specific statute might include an
examination of whether the three branches of government will
provide the normative roles initially assigned to these entities.85
Questions that could be considered here include whether the
statute provides sufficient terminology to notify citizens of the full
scope of what the executive can prosecute.  Will the statute require
executive stretching to have the conduct conform to the legislative
language?  Will judicial interpretation require referencing outside
sources to discern the scope of the legislation?  Will the executive in
fact be legislating in prosecuting prospective criminal conduct under
the statute?
Crucial to this analysis is the fact that the examination occurs pre-
legislative enactment.  In such an instance, the dilemma of whether
to provide a specific Beanie Baby fraud statute is subsidiary to the
decision of whether the legislation is warranted.  This methodology
proves beneficial in that it is not post-analysis reflection that is
considering whether the legislation, prosecution, and incarceration
of a defendant was proper.  Rather, this balancing approach
promotes judicial efficiency in having an initial decision as to whether
new legislation is warranted prior to using the legislation and finding
that the alleged conduct is not included within the statute’s scope.86
                                                                
83. See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing
the rule of lenity, whereby a court will interpret an ambiguous criminal statute more
favorably to a defendant unless there is “clear and definite language” necessitating a
stricter reading).
84. Cases that are ultimately dismissed by courts raise concerns about using
sparse prosecution resources inefficiently.  See supra note 23.
85. This Essay does not confront issues of the propriety of legislative delegation
of its powers. See generally Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:
Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal
Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 333 (1998) (describing the lack of discussion
concerning the initial role of branches of government in relation to federal and state
law).  Whether deference should be given to these congressional decisions is beyond
the scope of this Essay.  See Richman, supra note 19, at 758 (arguing that the
abdication of legislative responsibility in federal criminal law is part of the political
decision-making process of Congress).
86. One can also argue that this approach offers more predictable results.  See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U.
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Who conducts this test?  Will this disrupt the balancing process by
having one entity make the initial determination of whether to enact
the statute?87  These concerns are not stumbling blocks to this
analysis.  Historically, the legislature has made the decision of what
statutes to enact.88  Thus, it would be consistent with that role to have
the legislative body as the source for determining whether to endorse
a Beanie Baby fraud statute, to compromise with a product fraud
statute, or to continue use of the mail, wire, and computer fraud
statutes.89
Considerations of increased federalism and a need for statutes that
are not vague and ambiguous are but the first steps in deciding
whether specific legislation is warranted.  Adding to the examination,
a consideration of whether an appropriate balance of the
government branches will be achieved should immediately reduce
possible prosecutorial excesses in applying the law.  In addition to
offering clear legislation, this analysis also can reduce judicial
reversals that might accrue from the misuse of prosecutorial
discretion.90
                                                                
CHI. L. REV. 671, 672 (1999) (“Subjecting theories of statutory interpretation to
systematic factual testing, therefore, should be potentially attractive to both
formalists and pragmatists.”).
87. It can be argued that Congress could easily delegate its power to the
executive by an endorsement of open-ended prosecutorial discretion.  Such a
delegation would indicate congressional acceptance of increased executive power.
This, however, goes to the practicality of this proposal and not its merits.  One can
hope that Congress will endorse the merits of the analysis presented here and select
to keep their power.  See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine:  Could the Court
Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1227 (1985) (arguing for a more coherent
approach to delegation where the “statute itself must speak to what people cannot
do; the statute may not merely recite regulatory goals and leave it to an agency to
promulgate the rules to achieve those goals”).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89. The initial mail fraud statute, passed in 1872, focused on schemes of the post
office establishment.  See Michael McDonough, Mail Fraud and the Good Faith Defense,
14 ST. JOHN’S LEGAL COMMENT. 279, 282 (1999).  In response to differing
interpretations of the statute, Congress in 1889 amended the “scheme to defraud”
language of the statute listing an array of different schemes.  Id. at 283.  For example,
the mail fraud statute could be employed for “sawdust swindles” and counterfeit
schemes related to “green coin,” “green articles,” or “green cigars.”  See Rakoff, supra
note 20, at 809.  The specificity provided in this statute was later eliminated with the
adoption of a generic mail fraud statute.  See id. at 816-21.  The generic statute has
recently seen prosecutorial charging decisions that have not always been supported
by the courts.  See generally Podgor, Mail Fraud, supra note 22, passim (reviewing
decisions where courts have limited conduct subject to prosecution under the mail
fraud statute).
90. “Interbranch dialogue” can also offer positive direction in achieving
appropriate checks and balances.  See Peter M. Shane, Reflections in Three Mirrors:
Complexities of Representation in a Constitutional Democracy, 60 OHIO ST . L.J. 693, 693
(1999) (discussing the benefits of “substantial interaction among the branches”).
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CONCLUSION
Achieving the proper balance between the branches of government
does not require the extreme measure of having a specific Beanie
Baby fraud statute.  The prosecutorial charging discretion does not
need to be so constrained so that prosecution of new frauds, such as
fraudulent Pokemans, will not be allowed until the activity has
reached a level warranting specific legislative action.  On the other
extreme, a mail fraud statute that covers every imaginable fraud,
whether civil or criminal, may place too much power in the hands of
the executive.  This Essay argues that absurd legislation is not needed
to counteract generic statutes; rather, a balanced approach between
the branches should be adopted in combating Beanie Baby fraud.
